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Abstract
The relation between the ECB’s main refinancing (MRO) rates and the money market is key
for the monetary transmission process in the euro area. Thispaper investigates how money
market rates respond to the new information revealed by MRO auctions. Our results confirm
a stabilizing level relationship between the overnight rate Eonia and MRO rates before the
financial crisis. Since the start of the financial crisis, however, we find that MRO auction out-
comes even exacerbated the disconnection of money market rates f om the policy-intended
interest rate level. These findings support the fixed rate full allotment policy introduced by
the ECB as an unconventional measure to re-stabilize banks’refinancing conditions.
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1 Introduction
Weekly main refinancing operations (MROs) are of overwhelming importance for the monetary
policy implementation of the European Central Bank (ECB). The liquidity supply in MROs should
ensure that short-term money market rates closely follow the MRO rates and that their volatility
remains well contained, see e. g. Ejerskov et al. (2008). This central aim of monetary policy imple-
mentation has never been an easy task. Even before the financial crisis, a puzzling and unintended
upward trend in the spread between the European overnight rate (Eonia) and the MRO rates in-
dicated that the monetary transmission mechanism is not sufficiently understood, see Linzert and
Schmidt (2008).1 Since the start of the financial crisis, spreads between the ECB’s main refinanc-
ing rates and the money market rates have been huge and persistent. In order to shed more light on
the very beginning of the monetary transmission process in the euro area, this paper investigates
how the European money market responds to MRO auction outcomes.
On the allotment day, the ECB publishes the number of bidders, total allotment and total bids
together with the marginal and the weighted average allotmen rate of the MRO. All these variables
may contain new information about the expected course of monetary policy and the situation in the
money market. This paper assesses the role of MROs for the montary transmission mechanism by
estimating the response of money market rates to the variousaspects of a MRO auction outcome.
Our study can be related to two groups of papers. First, thereis a growing empirical literature
on the dynamics and the volatility of overnight rates. Recent examples include Bartolini and Prati
(2006), Pérez Quirós and Rodrı́guez Mendizábal (2006),Colarossi and Zaghini (2009), and Nautz
and Scheithauer (2009). All these contributions investigate how distinguishing features of the
central bank’s operational framework influence the behavior of vernight rates. They do not focus
on the response of the overnight rate to auction outcomes. The second group of papers explores
banks’ bidding behavior in central bank auctions, see e. g. Linzert et al. (2007), Bindseil et al.
(2009), and Cassola et al. (2009). Using individual biddingdata, it can be shown that money
market conditions significantly affect banks’ bidding behavior. These papers try to explain the
auction outcome but do not consider its repercussions on themoney market.
The current paper fills this gap and explores the impact of theECB’s MRO auctions on short-
1In contrast to earlier estimates of the liquidity effect, even the ECB’s provision of massive excess
liquidity in MROs could not bring the Eonia back to its intended level, see European Central Bank (2006).
In the U. S. the empirical relevance of the liquidity effect is also under debate, see e. g. Carpenter and
Demiralp (2008) and Thornton (2008).
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term money market rates in the euro area using both daily and intra-day data of overnight rates.
Longer-term Eonia swap rates are employed to examine how theauctions affect market’s expecta-
tions about future Eonia movements. Our results show that the recent crisis significantly impeded
the first step of the monetary transmission mechanism. Before the financial crisis, MRO auction
outcomes helped to stabilize the money market. If e. g. the spr ad between the Eonia and the new
MRO rate was above average, the Eonia would adjust accordingly. Since the outbreak of the crisis,
however, the stabilizing effect of MRO auctions on the Eonialevel has disappeared. In contrast,
MRO auction outcomes distorted by safety bids exacerbated th isconnection of money market
rates from the policy-intended interest rate level. Therefore, our results provide strong support for
the ECB’s decision to re-stabilize banks’ refinancing conditions by introducing a fixed rate full
allotment policy for the whole maturity spectrum of its refinancing operations as of October 2008.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the role of
MRO auctions in the operational framework of the ECB and consider the timing of the auctions.
Section 3 introduces the auction variables and discusses their expected influence on the money
market. Section 4 presents the empirical results on the impact of MRO auction outcomes on
money market rates before and during the crisis. Section 5 summarizes our main results and offers
some concluding remarks on the choice of MRO auction formatsfor the post-crisis period.
2 The Role of MRO Auctions in the ECB’s Operational
Framework
2.1 Monetary Policy Implementation
The ECB implements its monetary policy through a framework in which the banking sector op-
erates in a liquidity deficit vis-á-vis the Eurosystem. Thew ekly main refinancing operations
(MROs) cover the bulk of banks’ liquidity demand and play thepivotal role in signalling the mon-
etary policy stance. From June 2000 until October 2008, MROswere conducted as variable rate
tenders, i. e. as price-discriminatory multi-unit auctions where banks are allowed to submit multi-
ple price-quantity bids. In variable rate tenders the resulting repo rates partially depend on the bids
of the banks and, thus, are not under the ECB’s full control. Therefore, the ECB pre-announces a
minimum bid rate. The interest rates actually applied in theMROs can be viewed as the first step
in the transmission of monetary policy and should determinethe level of short-term interest rates
in the euro area’s money market.
Unlike the U. S. Federal Reserve Bank, the ECB has never announced an explicit operational
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target for its monetary policy implementation, see e. g. Ho (2008). However, there is no doubt
that the ECB’s liquidity policy aims at stabilizing the shortest money market rate, Eonia, to a level
close to its main refinancing rates, see e. g. Ejerskov et al. (2008). Figure 1 shows the corridor
in which the Eonia fluctuates between the two standing facilities and the minimum bid rate as its
mid-point.
Figure 1: The interest rate corridor of the ECB
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Notes: The light shaded area refers to the crisis period as of August 9, 2007. The
dashed vertical line represents the ECB’s adoption of the fixed rate tender procedure
with full allotment as of October 15, 2008.
On August 9, 2007 tensions surrounding assets backed by US sub-prime mortgages started
to spill over into money markets around the world, leading toliquidity shortages in the money
market. In the euro area, the overnight rate rose substantially following an increased liquidity
demand in the overnight market. As a consequence, the ECB increased the amount of liquidity in
its weekly MROs significantly. In order to account for the changes in the demand and supply of
liquidity in the ECB’s MROs, we allow money markets to respond differently to auction results
after August 2007. Therefore, we explore the link between thEonia and MROs for the crisis and
pre-crisis sample separately. In fact, splitting our sample on August 9, 2007 is also implied by
structural breakpoint tests, see Section B in the Appendix.
After Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the crisis intensified.
Banks became even more reluctant to engage in interbank money market trading and relied to
an increasing extent on the ECB’s refinancing operations, see e. g. Hauck and Neyer (2010). On
October 15, 2008 the ECB responded to the exacerbated crisisand witched from the variable rate
tender format to a fixed rate full allotment policy, hence satisfying the full liquidity demand of the
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banking sector.2 The information content of an auction outcome is very limited under this format:
In a fixed rate tender, the repo rate is pre-announced and all MRO rates are equal by construction.
Moreover, due to full allotment, the cover-to-bid ratio is alw ys one. Therefore, in the following
empirical analysis on the information content of MROs, we shall focus on the variable rate tender
period. Yet, our results may shed light on the rationale behind the ECB’s switch to the fixed rate
full allotment tender format.
2.2 Measuring the Money Market Response to an MRO Auction Out-
come
In the MROs of the ECB, banks are invited to submit their bids from Monday 3:30 p. m. CET to
Tuesday 9:30 a. m. CET. At Tuesday 11:20 a. m. CET, the ECB communicates the auction outcome
via its wire service. The response of the money market to an auction outcome should be reflected
in overnight rates observed immediately after the auction results are available. Letib andia be the
market rates validbefore andafter banks are informed about the auction outcomes. The money
market response to the auction is then revealed in∆i = ia − ib. We measure∆i in three ways.
First, in line with the empirical literature, we use daily data of the Eonia, the European Over-Night
Index Average published by the ECB.3 Eonia rates refer to transactions carried out before the
closing of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system at 6.00p m. CET and are published on the
same evening. Since the bulk of money market transactions are car ied out after the auction result
is announced, the timing of MROs suggests to use Eonia rates of Monday (ib) and Tuesday (ia) to
measure the money market reaction to an auction outcome.
If money markets react quickly to new information about the liquidity situation, theaverage
overnight rate at the auction day might be only a poor approximation foria and similar problems
may apply toib. Therefore, in a second specification of∆i, we use intra-day quotes collected
from Reuters at 9:30 a. m. CET and 11:25 a. m. CET forib andia, respectively. These rates are
very close to the end of bid submission and the announcement of the auction outcome. Yet the
available intra-day data bears two shortcomings. Firstly,intra-day data cover only that part of
the ’over the counter’ (OTC) market trading that is processed through brokers. Thus, transactions
between banks directly are missing. And secondly, in contrast o the daily Eonia data, intra-day
2On March 4, 2010 the ECB announced that the full allotment policy for MROs will be applied at least
until October 2010, see ECB’s press release webpage. For further explanations, refer to European Central
Bank (2010).
3The Eonia is based on a panel of approx. 50 banks with the highest business volume in the euro area
money market, see http://www.euribor.org.
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data only refer to unbinding quotes rather than actual transactions.
A third approximation of∆i uses daily data of Eonia swap rates with one-week maturity
obtained from Reuters. Because MROs are conducted only oncea w ek, the one-week Eonia
swap rate cannot be affected by expectations about future auction outcomes at an auction day.
Since March 2008, the announcement of Eonia swap rates has changed from 4:30 p. m. CET to 11
a. m. CET. In line with the timing of MROs, the definition of∆i is adjusted accordingly.
Starting with the first price-discriminatory multi-unit auction on June 27, 2000 we have col-
lected 434 auctions until October 14, 2008. The intra-day data is only available for December 4,
2000 to June 17, 2008. For the sake of comparability, we will run all our regressions from De-
cember 4, 2000 to June 17, 2008. At the end of the reserve mainten ce period, when no further
MRO will be conducted, liquidity shortages or excess reserves can lead to dramatic increases of
overnight rate volatility. It is well understood by the market that these seasonal interest rate fluc-
tuations are temporary and unrelated to monetary policy signals, see e. g. Nautz and Offermanns
(2008). To ensure that our results will not depend on the large Eonia movements at the very last
day of the reserve period, we excluded the auctions performed at those particular days from our
regressions.4 After these sample adjustments, we are left with 282 and 33 auctions before and
during the crisis, respectively.
3 The MRO Auction Outcomes: Variables and Predictions
On the allotment day, the ECB publishes (i) the marginal rate(rm) of the MRO, (ii) the quantity
weighted average rate (rw) of all successful bids, (iii) total bids and total allotments, and (iv) the
number of bidders. All these variables may contain new information about the situation in the
money market and the policy-intended interest rate level.
Themarginal rate or stop-out rate of a MRO,rm, depends on both, banks’ bidding behavior
and the ECB’s allotment decision. In any case, deviations ofthe marginal rate from the overnight
rate valid immediately before the auction,rm − ib, should imply that the overnight rateia adjusts
accordingly. In an error-correction type adjustment equation of ∆i, the coefficient ofrm − ib is
expected to be positive.
4For the sake of robustness, two further observations were identified as outliers: the MRO with anoma-
lous allotment one week after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 and the MRO distorted by the
announcement of the six-month supplementary operation in April 2008.
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Before the crisis, theweighted average rate of a MRO,rw, used to be only a few basis points
above the marginal rate. By contrast, after August 2007, theMRO spread,rw−rm, increased up to
30 basis points, see Figure A.1. The MRO spread can be large for two reasons. On the one hand, it
may indicate that the bulk of bids had been submitted at relativ y high rates because the demand
for liquidity had been stronger than expected. Particularly in the recent financial crisis, banks faced
a great uncertainty regarding their future liquidity situation. According to Cassola et al. (2009),
banks submitted more aggressive bids in order to make sure that they receive at least a minimum
level of liquidity. On the other hand, large MRO spreads may reveal bidders’ uncertainty about
the auction’s marginal rate, see e. g. Välimäki (2008). The increased heterogeneity of values for
liquidity revealed by the auction and the failure of the interbank market to lead to an efficient
allocation of liquidity among banks in the course of the crisis made it very difficult to forecast the
marginal rate of MRO auctions. For both reasons, a MRO auction revealing a large MRO spread
should lead to an upward pressure on the overnight rate.
The cover-to-bid ratio, CBR, of a MRO is defined as the ratio between the ECB’s total al-
lotment and the banks’ total bid volume, compare Figure A.2.Large cover-to-bid ratios indicate
that banks received a lot of refinancing relative to their bids. One might expect that overnight
rates should always decrease with increasing cover-to-bidratios. However, as Linzert et al. (2007)
already emphasized, a low cover-to-bid ratio only leads to money market tensions if it resulted
from banks’ misperceptions of the marginal rate and the situation in the money market. If banks
bid seriously and the marginal rate of the MRO simply exceeded banks’ willingness to pay, a low
cover-to-bid ratio will not necessarily lead to increasingovernight rates.
Until March 2004, banks anticipated future rate cuts of the ECB on several occasions and,
therefore, simply refrained from bidding. As a result, banks’ total bid volume was so low that
the ECB could not allot the intended volume of reserves. Due to banks’ underbidding, the cover-
to-bid ratio peaked to one but due to the lack of reserves overnight rates increased sharply at the
auction day. In order to stop the disturbing strategic bidding behavior of banks, the ECB adjusted
its operational framework in March 2004. Reducing the MRO maturity from two to one week
and synchronizing its interest rate decisions with the reserv requirement periods ensured that
auction results are not affected by banks’ expectations about future policy rates, see e. g. European
Central Bank (2003). To avoid that our results are driven by underbidding episodes, we exclude
these observations from the following regressions and allow for a different information content of
cover-to-bid ratios before and after March 2004.
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Thenumber of bidders in MROs has significantly declined since June 2000, see Figure A.3.
Following e. g. Bindseil et al. (2009), we estimated the new information contained in the number
of bidders, i. e. the unexpected part in this variable, employing a univariate forecast equation, see
Section C in the Appendix. Note that alternative forecast and de-trending methods would not
affect our results in a significant way. In case of a surprisingly large number of bidders which
should reveal an unexpectedly high demand for refinancing, the overnight rate should increase.
Daily autonomous liquidity factors and reserve requirements drive banks’ liquidity needs.
Since June 2000, the ECB uses weekly autonomous factors forecasts to rationalize its current allot-
ment decision and to determine its benchmark allotment. If actual autonomous factors are higher
than the ECB’s benchmark allotment calculation would suggest, the liquidity situation should be
tight leading to tensions in the overnight rate, see Linzertand Schmidt (2008). Therefore, the
difference betweenupdated forecasts and forecasted autonomous factors, ∆AF , should be in-
cluded as a control variable in the empirical analysis of thelink between MROs and the money
market. While the ECB’s forecast of autonomous factors is known to the banks before the MRO
auction is conducted, the updated values are provided on theallotment day together with the MRO
auction results, between 11:15 a. m. CET and 11:20 a. m. CET. Therefore, we would expect∆AF
to increase daily overnight rates.
4 The Response of Money Market Rates to MRO Auction
Outcomes
Our empirical results on the information content of the ECB’s MRO auctions are based on the
following error-correction type adjustment equation for the money market rate,
∆it = c+ α(rm − ib)t + β(rw − rm)t
+ γCCBRt + γBBt + γA∆AFt + εt, (1)
where for each auctiont,∆it = ia,t−ib,t denotes the change of the money market rate immediately
after the MRO auction results have been published.α andβ determine the impact of the marginal
(rm) and the weighted average MRO rate (rw) on the Eonia.α = 0 implies that the Eonia is
disconnected from both MRO rates, since there is neither an equilibrium relation with the marginal
nor with the weighted average MRO rate. In case ofα 6= 0 andβ = 0, there is an equilibrium
relation between the levels of the Eonia and the marginal rate while the weighted average rate
plays no additional role.α = β 6= 0 implies thatα(rm − ib) + α(rw − rm) = α(rw − ib). In this
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case, the overnight rate is predominantly affected by the weight d average MRO rate.CBR and
B denote the auction’s cover to bid ratio and the unexpected part in the number of bidders,∆AF
controls for news concerning autonomous factors. According to Section 3, the expected signs of
the coefficients areγC < 0, γB > 0, γA > 0.
4.1 The Connection between the Eonia and the MRO rates before the
Financial Crisis
Table 1 shows the results obtained for the change of the Eoniain response to a MRO auction
outcome. In the pre-crisis sample, the estimates indicate asignificant and plausibly signed re-
sponse of the overnight rate to the newly announced main refinanci g rates. Irrespective of the
interest rate measure,α̂ > 0 implies an error-correction type level relationship between the Eonia
and MRO rates. Specifically, for the daily and intra-day Eonia data, Wald tests cannot reject the
null-hypothesis thatα = β. This suggests that the weighted average MRO rate, not the marginal
rate, governs the level of the overnight rate. For the one-wek Eonia swap rates, the relevant in-
formation revealed by MRO rates is contained in the marginalrate. In fact, the corresponding
adjustment coefficient̂α = 0.8586 is very close to one. Thus, news about the marginal MRO
rate strongly influence market’s expectations about the Eonia f the following week. In line with
the central role of MROs in the transmission process of monetary policy, the evidence in favor of
an error-correction type adjustment of the Eonia confirms that MRO auctions stabilized the Eonia
before the crisis.
The results obtained for the impact of the cover-to-bid ratio CBR are also in line with expec-
tations. Before the introduction of the new operational framework in 2004, results concerning the
significance and sign of the estimatedCBR coefficients are mixed which reflects the distortions
in theCBR implied by banks’ strategic bidding behavior. After March 2004, the ECB’s reform
apparently re-established the information content ofCBRs about banks’ liquidity situation. Ac-
cording to our estimates, an increase of the cover-to-bid rat o by ten percentage points decreases
the Eonia by about 0.5 basis points.
Further plausible, yet less significant results are obtained for the number of bidders. For daily
data, we estimate that an unexpected increase of the number of idders by 100 would decrease the
Eonia by about 3 basis points. The results obtained for∆AF , the variable reflecting news about
autonomous factors, are more puzzling. Although the ECB hasalways been eager to estimate and
publish its forecasts on autonomous factors on a regular basis, the evidence on the information
content of this variable for the money market is rather weak.
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Table 1: The Money Market Response to a MRO Outcome
Money Market Response (∆it)
∆it = c+ α(rm − ib)t + β(rw − rm)t + γCCBRt + γBBt + γA∆AFt + ǫt
Pre–Crisis: June 2000 - August 2007 Crisis: August 2007 - October 2008
Auction Variables Daily Eonia Intra Day Data 1–Week Eonia Daily Eonia Intra Day Data 1–Week Eonia
Swap Rates Swap Rates
(rm − ib) 0.5190
[0.1301]
∗∗∗ 0.2655
[0.0921]
∗∗∗ 0.8587
[0.1209]
∗∗∗ −0.0725
[0.0687]
0.0583
[0.0674]
−0.0050
[0.0795]
(rw − rm) 0.5166
[0.2354]
∗∗ 0.2953
[0.1539]
∗ 0.1467
[0.2295]
1.4565
[0.8733]
∗ 1.9740
[0.7260]
∗∗∗ 0.7891
[0.4014]
∗
Cover-to-Bid Ratio (CBR)
before March 2004 0.0922
[0.0318]
∗∗∗ −0.0287
[0.0119]
∗∗ −0.0036
[0.0221]
after March 2004 −0.0649
[0.0295]
∗∗ −0.0541
[0.0223]
∗∗ −0.0287
[0.0285]
−0.2359
[0.1227]
∗ −0.2523
[0.1379]
∗ −0.2395
[0.0600]
∗∗∗
Number of Bidders (B) 0.0003
[0.0002]
∗ 0.0001
[0.0001]
0.0000
[0.0010]
0.0012
[0.0003]
∗∗∗ 0.0005
[0.0003]
0.0034
[0.0017]
∗
Autonomous Factors (∆AF ) 0.0009
[0.0004]
∗∗ 0.0002
[0.0003]
−0.0006
[0.0002]
∗∗∗ 0.0015
[0.0009]
∗ 0.0001
[0.0012]
−0.0002
[0.0007]
Obs. 282 282 282 33 33 33
R2 0.58 0.45 0.65 0.72 0.41 0.40
Wald tests of parameter equality: H0 : α = β vs H1 : α 6= β
p-value 0.98 0.82 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.05
Notes: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses. The index t denotes the number
of the MROs covering the period December 2000 to June 2008.
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4.2 The Disconnection between the Eonia and the MRO Rates during
the Financial Crisis
For the crisis period, the results for the empirical relationship between the Eonia and the MRO
rates are shown in the right panel of Table 1. They differ fromthose obtained for the pre-crisis
period in two important aspects. First, the estimates implythat the Eonia and the effective key
interest rates of the ECB have been disconnected. There is nosig ificant error-correction type
adjustment of the Eonia to the level of the MRO rates in the crisis period, i. e.α = 0. As a
consequence, MRO rates failed to stabilize the Eonia in the crisis. Second, according to the large
and significant estimates forβ the main information revealed by MRO auctions is now contained
in the spread between the MRO rates(rw − rm) and not in their levels.
During the crisis, huge MRO spreads inflated by safety bids strred by banks’ uncertainty about
their refinancing conditions increased the Eonia and exacerb t d the disconnection of money mar-
ket rates from the policy-intended interest rate level. In sharp contrast to their stabilizing effect
before the crisis, the outcomes of MRO auctions thus contributed to de-stabilize money market
rates. In a vicious circle, a large MRO spread increased the Eonia, impaired banks’ refinancing
conditions and hence created even higher MRO spreads. In view of these problems, our empir-
ical results strongly support the ECB’s decision to re-stabilize banks’ refinancing conditions by
introducing a fixed rate full allotment policy in its MROs as of October 2008.
Probably reflecting the decreasing role of the main refinancing rates, the estimated adjustment
equation of the Eonia indicates a growing importance of the refinancing volumes allotted in the
MRO auctions. According to the estimates, an increase in thecov r-to-bid ratioCBR by 10
percentage points would lower the Eonia by roughly 2.5 basispoints. Note that a stronger effect
on the Eonia can also be observed for the number of bidders.
4.3 MRO Auctions and Longer-Term Interest Rates during the Crisis
In October 2008, the ECB stopped the de-stabilizing effect of the MRO spread by switching the
MRO auction format from variable rate to fixed rate tenders with full allotment. In a fixed rate
tender with full allotment, all information about the MRO related refinancing conditions is already
pre-announced. The new auction format ensures that the cover-to-bid ratio equals one and that
the MRO spread is zero by construction. According to our estimates for the Eonia, both measures
have contributed to improve banks’ refinancing conditions.
However, the ECB took additional, even more unconventionalmeasures to stabilize the situ-
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ation in the money market. Before the crisis, the ECB was veryr luctant to give strong signals
about the policy-intended level of longer-term money market ates. As a consequence, longer-term
refinancing operations (LTROs) have always been conducted as variable rate tenders without min-
imum bid rate, see Linzert et al. (2007). Since October 2008,however, the fixed rate full allotment
policy has been also applied to the ECB’s longer-term refinanci g operations. Moreover, while
the maximum maturity of LTROs has been three month before thecrisis, the ECB additionally
introduced LTROs with maturities of one, six and even twelvemonths. In order to shed more light
on the rationale behind these measures, we investigate whether the de-stabilizing effects of MROs
observed for the Eonia can also be found for longer-term money market rates.
To that aim, we adopt the empirical approach of the previous sections and regress the change
of longer-term Eonia swap rates at an auction day on the variables characterizing the MRO auction
outcome. The Eonia swap market is the most important derivative market segment in the euro area,
see Durré (2006). The change of the Eonia swap rate at the auction day should reflect the impact
of the auction outcome on market’s expectations about future Eonia rates, see Taylor and Williams
(2009).
The results obtained for the swap rates are very similar to those obtained for the Eonia for
all maturities under consideration, compare Table 1 and Table 2. In particular, there is clear ev-
idence suggesting the absence of a stabilizing level relationship between the longer-term money
market rates and the MRO rates, i. e.α = 0. As expected, longer-term money market rates re-
act stronger to news about the future path of short-term rates nd less to its current level. It is
more striking, however, that large MRO spreads(rw − rm) led also to significant and presumably
policy-unintended increases of the longer-term money market rates, i. e.β > 0.
It is well-known that interest rate expectations affect thebidding behavior and, thereby, the
results of MRO auctions, see e. g. Bindseil et al. (2009). However, Table 2 shows that - vice versa
- MRO auctions can reveal information that may also affect banks’ interest rate expectations.
The significant response of longer-term swap rates suggeststhat the large MRO spreads observed
until October 2008 even de-stabilized longer-term money market rates. These results provide
strong support for the ECB’s switch to the fixed rate full allotment policy even in its longer-term
refinancing operations.
11
Table 2: The Longer-Term Money Market Response to a MRO Outcome during the Crisis
Response of longer-term money market rates (∆it)
∆it = c+ α(rm − ib)t + β(rw − rm)t + γCCBRt + γBBt + γA∆AFt + ǫt
Crisis: August 2007 - June 2008
Auction Variables 1–Month Eonia 3–Month Eonia 6–Month Eonia 12–Month Eonia
Swap Rates Swap Rates Swap Rates Swap Rates
(rm − ib) −0.0050
[0.0400]
0.0582
[0.0460]
0.0570
[0.0528]
0.0425
[0.0426]
(rw − rm) 0.5848
[0.1829]
∗∗∗ 0.6537
[0.2589]
∗∗ 0.7844
[0.3213]
∗∗ 1.3251
[0.5366]
∗∗
Cover-to-Bid Ratio (CBR) −0.1341
[0.0304]
∗∗∗ −0.0868
[0.00313]
∗∗∗ −0.0669
[0.0570]
−0.1458
[0.0866]
∗
Number of Bidders (B) 0.0002
[0.0001]
∗∗ 0.0003
[0.0001]
∗∗∗ 0.0002
[0.0001]
∗ 0.0005
[0.0002]
∗∗
Autonomous Factors (∆AF ) 0.0001
[0.0003]
0.0003
[0.0004]
0.0001
[0.0005]
−0.0002
[0.0008]
Obs. 33 33 33 33
R2 0.53 0.35 0.21 0.25
Notes: For further explanations, see Table 1.
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5 Concluding Remarks
The interest rates applied in the main refinancing operations (MROs) of the ECB constitute the
very beginning of the monetary transmission process in the euro area. For the implementation
of monetary policy, the connection between the main refinanci g rates and the short-term interest
rates in the money market is of particular importance. In line with their predominant role for
monetary policy implementation, the results of MRO auctions should have a strong and stabilizing
impact on money market conditions. This paper assessed the empirical relationship between MRO
auctions and the money market by investigating the responsef money market rates to MRO
auction outcomes.
Our results show that the financial crisis distorted the relationship between MROs and the
money market in two important ways. First, we find that the leve of money market rates has been
disconnected from MRO rates since the outbreak of the crisisin August 2007. In contrast to the
pre-crisis period, MRO auction outcomes fail to stabilize money market rates during the financial
crisis. This implies that the first step of the transmission channel of monetary policy has been
interrupted.
The second change in the relationship between MRO auctions and the money market concerns
the role of the MRO spread, i. e. the difference between the weight d average and the marginal
MRO rate. While MRO spreads have been typically small beforethe crisis, in the crisis MRO
spreads were inflated by safety bids reflecting the increaseduncertainty of banks about their re-
financing conditions. In contrast to the stabilizing impactof MRO auctions before the crisis, the
response of money market rates to the MRO spreads de-stabilized money market conditions by
exacerbating the disconnection of money market rates from the policy-intended interest rate level.
This self-enforcing destabilization is also found for longer-term money market rates. Both find-
ings strongly support the ECB’s decision made in October 2008 to re-stabilize banks’ refinancing
conditions by adopting a fixed rate full allotment policy in its MROs and also in its longer-term
refinancing operations (LTROs).
The ECB has repeatedly emphasized that the conduct of MROs as’fixed rate tenders with full
allotment’ can only be a temporary measure in response to thefinancial crisis, see e. g. European
Central Bank (2010). How should the ECB perform its MRO auctions after the crisis? According
to the empirical auction literature the optimal choice of the auction format is not obvious. In par-
ticular, the ECB experienced that the rationing of bids in a fixed rate tenderwithout full allotment
13
led to an escalating overbidding problem, i. e. banks increasingly exaggerated their bid volumes to
circumvent the rationing, see Nautz and Oechssler (2006). In June 2000, the ECB stopped banks’
overbidding by switching to a price-discriminatory variable rate tender format. Since successful
banks ’pay what they bid’, the effective refinancing rate differs across banks. This paper demon-
strated that - particularly in times of market stress - largeMRO spreads, defined as the difference
between the weighted average and marginal MRO rate, may de-stabilize money market rates in
a significant way. It is therefore worth noting that the price-discriminatory variable rate tender is
not the only option of the ECB. In particular, the Dutch or competitive auction format, where each
successful bidder pays the marginal rate and, thus, MRO spreads are zero by construction, could
be an alternative to the ECB’s standard variable rate tender.
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A Figures
Figure A.1: The spread between the MRO rates (in percent)
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Notes: The MRO spread is defined as the difference between the weighted average
and marginal MRO rate. Since the daily dataset has been pared down to the auction
relevant days, the drawn data has not a daily frequency. The x-axis, therefore, refers
to respective auction t. The light shaded area refers to the crisis period as of August
9, 2007.
Figure A.2: The MRO’s cover-to-bid ratio
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Notes: The aggregate bid volume and total allotment are in EUR billions. The black
dashed line represents the introduction of the new operational framework as of March
2004. For further explanations, see Figure A.1.
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Figure A.3: The number of bidders in MROs
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Notes: For further explanations, see Figure A.1 and Figure A.2.
Figure A.4: Updated forecasts minus forecasted autonomous factors around MROs (in
EUR billions)
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Notes: For further explanations, see Figure A.1 and Figure A.2
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B Structural break test
This section uses structural break tests to investigate whether the financial crisis had a significant
impact on the relationship between the ECB’s MRO auctions and the money market. To that
aim, the Quandt-Andrews test for unknown breakpoints is applied to the error-correction type
adjustment equation of the Eonia, compare equation(1):
∆it = c+ α(rm − ib)t + β(rw − rm)t
+ γCCBRt + γBBt + γA∆AFt + εt,
We test whether there has been a break in the equation parametersc, α, β, γB, andγA for the full
sample from June 27, 2000 to October 14, 2008.5 The Quandt-Andrews test is based on standard
F-statistics, see Andrews (1993).Max F denotes the maximum of the individualF-statistics
while theAvestatistic refers to their average. Since the break point is unknown, the asymptotic
distribution of both test statistics are non standard and depend on the number of coefficients that
are allowed to break and on the fraction of the sample that is examined.6 Approximate asymptotic
p-values are calculated following Hansen (1997).
Table B.1: Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test
Statistic Daily Eonia Intra Day Data
Max F (08/09/2007) 19.06
[0.0556]
17.77
[0.0878]
Ave F 11.54
[0.0047]
13.22
[0.0012]
Notes: Estimated break date and approximate asymptotic p-values in
line with Hansen (1997) in parenthesis. Test sample: June 27, 2000
to October 14, 2008 for daily Eonia and December 4, 2000 to June 17,
2008 for intra day data. Number of breaks compared: 318 and 284,
respectively.
The results confirm that the role of MRO auctions for the moneymarket has significantly
changed since the start of the financial crisis. For both, daily and intra-day data, theMax F
statistics chooses the first MRO auction after the outbreak of the crisis as the main candidate for a
significant break point.
5Note that we already accounted a structural change in the role of CBR stirred by the reform of the
ECB’s operational framework as of March 2004. Therefore, we have excluded γC from the test.
6Note that the distributions become degenerate as the first period tested approaches the beginning of
the equation sample, or the end period approaches the end of the equation sample. To compensate for this
behavior it is generally suggested to exclude the end of the equation sample from the testing procedure.
Following Andrews (1993), we apply a symmetric ”trimming” of 5%.
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C Forecast equation of number of bidders
Following e.g. Bindseil et al. (2009) and Linzert et al. (2007), we estimate the unexpected part
in the number of bidders by regressing the number of bidders (Bt) in the current auctiont on the
number of bidders in previous auctions. With respect to the changes in seasonality and maturity in
the ECB’s operational framework as of March 2004, we estimate the forecast equations for each
subperiod separately:
BOldFrameworkt = 19.83
(7.7)
+ 0.39
(0.05)
Bt−1 + 0.52
(0.05)
Bt−2 (2)
− 73.98
(15.90)
DUnderbidt + 92.45
(93.08)
DUnderbidt−1 + 21.07
(16.17)
DUnderbidt−2 ,
with R2 = 0.86 for the sample prior to March 2004 and
BNewFrameworkt = 101.61
(27.54)
+ 0.72
(0.08)
Bt−1, (3)
with R2 = 0.52 after March 2004 until October 2008. Newey-West HAC standard errors
are reported in parentheses.DUnderbidt is a dummy variable whereD
Underbid
t = 1 captures the
underbidding episodes that occurred in auctiont.7 The bi-weekly and weekly maturity of the
MROs before and after March 2004, respectively, suggests the choice of the lag structure.
7The underbidding events refer to the MROs on 13 Feb, 10 Apr, 9 Oct and 6 Nov 2001, 3 Dec and 17
Dec 2002, 3 Mar, 3 Jun and 25 Nov 2003 and 20 Feb , see Bindseil (2004).
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